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PROLEGOMENA TO CONSERVATION:
A FISHEYE REVIEW*
CHANNING KURY
INTRODUCTION
Conservation philosophy is the examination of the assumptions
and methodologies of decision-making in regard to resources. Con-
servation is not research, legislation, public relations or harvesting,
although these are important facets of conservation. These facets are
functions of decisions to act in a particular manner in a given factual
context. Rationality is the key concept, but both normative and
positive elements are present in any conservation philosophy, he
definition of conservation as "wise use of natural resources" is, while
tautologically correct, almost useless as a guide to analysis and
action. In 1938, Harold A. Innis noted the lack of philosophy in
American conservation literature because "the whole question of
conservation is begged by its definition as 'wise use.' "'
Conservation deals with practical problems. A simple example was
presented during the environmental movement of the last few years
by the suggestion that a blow for conservation could be struck by
not buying a cut Christmas tree. Some people took this suggestion
seriously, apparently because it was intuitively obvious that one way
to conserve our forests and our environment would be to discourage
the cutting of trees. Christmas trees are, however, typically young
conifers which have been specifically planted, often on marginal
farmlands, and periodically pruned for the purpose of supplying the
Christmas market. A boycotter would certainly not have been pro-
tecting virgin forest or wilderness; he would not even have been
attacking bad land use. Since mature trees require much more space
than young trees, the boycotter would not even have been neces-
sarily taking action beneficial to the establishment of more wood-
land. A possible rationale for the boycott could have been the build-
ing of a reverence for nature by imbueing a sacredness to living
objects. This building of reverence might be a tenable posture; the
advocacy of a significant and direct beneficial effect is not.2
*Copyright © 1977 by Channing Kury.
1. Innis, The Economics of Conservation, 28 Geographical Rev. 137 (1938).
2. See, regarding wartime voluntary sugar rationing, H. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO
GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW 63-64 (1958).
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AN OBJECTIVE YET INCOMPLETE DEFINITION OF CONSERVATION
Conservation is the art of rational behavior in the context of social
and natural limitations. That which constitutes rational, choosing
means appropriate to the ends, behavior is not intuitively obvious
and is not necessarily easily determined. Smokey the Bear, frontman
for the United States Forest Service, has done an eloquent public
relations job in convincing people that forest fires are bad, a message
which is backed up by television coverage of burning homes and
conflagrations that occur in California as well as other states. For-
esters, wildlife managers and range scientists have, however, said for
years that there are definite benefits to be gained from forest fires,
particularly those fires which are deliberately set and controlled by
persons with specific, rational goals in mind. Some of the benefits
which might accrue from a forest fire include increased blueberry
production, establishment of forage areas for deer and destruction of
brush which adversely affects forest regeneration. Quite obviously,
forest fires can destroy thousands of board feet of timber, but
charred logs are not necessarily a sight to be regretted prior to a
totally encompassing evaluation to determine whether the fire was an
optimal event.
Similarly, an encompassing evaluation is a necessary prerequisite
to an assuredly rational decision on a course of action to be taken.
For many years, Alaska prohibited the establishment of a highly
efficient salmon fishery.' The same or larger amount of fish could
have been caught more cheaply if the most efficient placement of
fish-traps and severe limitation of entry into the business had been
permitted. The industry could have saved a large amount of money,
although it is unlikely that this saving would have reached the con-
sumer. The resulting increase in profit could have been appropriated
for salmon research and production, or simply used for dividends.
But, as those who are acquainted with benefit-cost ratios, regional
analysis and depression economics know, a private cost can be a
social benefit. In this example, unemployment was high throughout
the west coast of North America during 1970 and the social cost of
increased efficiency in the salmon industry could have been increased
unemployment. A question which needs to be answered in such a
case is what is the trade-off from a social viewpoint for the gain
proposed by a technical viewpoint? In this particular case the trade-
3. Article VIII, § 15, of the Alaska Constitution was amended in 1972 to permit Alaska
"to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic
distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote
the efficient development of aquaculture in the State."
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off would change with the state of the economy, so a pat answer
would be unacceptable. 4
Rational behavior, on either an individual or collective basis,
demands the foregoing of a gain or benefit for the greatest gain or
benefit. This imperative is the link between rationality and opti-
mality since optimality can be defined as the greatest gain or benefit
measured in comprehensive terms. Gains or benefits are not neces-
sarily reflected in the gross national product, as currently for-
mulated, and gains or benefits are not identical for all people. A
person who suddenly finds himself five dollars richer may purchase a
book or place the money in a savings account or take any of a
number of other actions. What would be rational would certainly not
be obvious to another party and the first party would not necessarily
be aware of what action would be best. While individuals frequently
do know what is best for them in day-to-day matters, major decisions
and unusual occurrences are often inappropriately handled. Collec-
tive decision-making suffers a similar malfunction because collective
decisions are nevertheless made by individuals. A collective decision
often differs from a simple amassing of individual opinions or votes
due to a rebounding reinforcement of the rectitude, distinct from
the legitimization by consensus, of the decisions in the minds of the
people who make and who carry out the decision.
Since rational behavior is neither obviobs nor simple, there is a
body of knowledge, based more on awareness than precision, which
needs to be learned, developed, used and extended. Awareness allows
an encompassing evaluation of accuracy, but precision, prerequisited
by specialization, encourages an overemphasis on part of the problem
but an appalling simultaneous ignorance of the other parts and con-
text. The result may be carefully planned mistakes. The body of
knowledge needed for a totally encompassing evaluation is not
amenable as a whole to scientific analysis. Although part of the
necessary knowledge is amenable to such analysis, an ever changing
state of nature, society, and mind limits the value of this portion.
Behavior occurs in a context of social and natural limitations (con-
straints). A social limitation is the delineation of what may and of
what may not be done; a natural limitation is the delineation of what
can and of what can not be done. These limitations have changed and
will continue to do so. Social limitations have their roots in morality
and legality; natural limitations have their causes in economic con-
ditions, technology, resources, nature and the relationship between
thought and nature. Social and natural limitations bound an abstract
4. Optimality is not a constant state.
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set of feasible behavior patterns, both rational and irrational.' The
goal of conservation is to insure that when individuals and societies
face a decision they choose a course of action that is rational and
feasible. Some rational behavior patterns are mutually exclusive6 and
so no one integrated set of rational behavior patterns can be the goal
of conservation. Considerable latitude exists in the set of the rational
within the set of the feasible. Conservation aids not so much in
choosing the course of action to be taken as much as aiding in the
choosing not to take a particular course because the action is either
irrational or infeasible.'7 Conservation eliminates infeasible and irra-
tional behavior patterns to establish a set of one or more rational
patterns, any one of which may be chosen, even at whim, by an
individual or society. The expansion and contraction of this set of
the rational feasible is a function of the state of knowledge.
Conservation can be considered an activity in which various trade-
offs are examined in order to maximize the well-being of individuals
and society. Conservation attempts to reconcile desires, present
needs and predominant beliefs with available resources, future needs
and rational thought. Conservation will continue to be misconstrued
and misused because people will confuse its medium with their
messages. Conservation is a medium and, as such, is permanent and
useful. To construe conservation as a message is to make it ephemeral
and of little utility.
MAN, MIND AND LAND
Walter Firey's Man, Mind and Land: a theory of resource use' is
an exposition of a conservation theory premised on concepts of
possibility, adoptability and gainfulness. Possibility is an ecological
criterion, adoptability is an ethnological criterion and gainfulness is
an economic criterion.
As a general and realistic proposition, the sets of optimal resource
processes defined by each of these criteria do not perfectly and
completely coincide. Firey submits that not one of the three criteria
of possibility, adoptability or gainfulness can, by itself, "provide an
adequate rationale for what resource planners are doing or are able to
do."9 He goes on to say that:
5. Feasibility is quite different for an amoral, immoral or extralegal person.
6. The optimal intersection of the production possibility curve and the indifference curve
consists of a set of points, not one point, in a realistically complex situation.
7. Within this article, the irrational is defined as a subset of the feasible because accom-
plishment is presupposed. It is evident, though, that to attempt the infeasible would be
irrational. A legal and moral decision is assumed.
8. W. FIREY, MAN, MIND AND LAND: A THEORY OF RESOURCE USE (1960).
9. Id. at 251.
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No theory, of course, can be expected to explain all aspects of the
realm of events with which it is concerned. Neither can any one
theory serve as an all-purpose guide to. policy formation. The re-
source planner needs more than a theory of how resource users
actually behave; he needs some "as if" theories, some fictional
theories, as it were, of how people ought to behave if certain ab-
stract limiting conditions are to be approached (even though they
can never be reached). Such theories provide the planner with some
generalized reference points against which he can plot the relative
position which a given resource system occupies .... 1 0
Firey hypothesizes an analytical system based on a set of inter-
related concepts. His resource systems are sets of resource pro-
cesses' I which are events which recur in time and which involve
somewhat the same combination of human and biophysical fac-
tors.' 2 A resource system is a man-mind-land structure which im-
poses a special kind of constraint or necessity upon its human agents
such that there is a sufficient reason for them to willingly confine
their behavior to the practices which comprise the resource sys-
tem.' 3
Firey distinguishes two types of resource systems: resource com-
plexes and resource congeries. A resource complex shows some
constancy and stability in the face of changes that are external to
itself and is composed of specially designated resource practices.
Resource congeries show no such stability but vary widely in re-
sponse to external changes.' '
Resource systems are analyzed by Firey with his three criteria:
possibility, adoptability, and gainfulness. Each of these terms is a
word of art in Firey's system. In order for a set of resource processes
to be "possible" in a given habitat, these processes must be in some
equilibrium over the long run with that habitat.' ' If a resource
process is to be "adoptable" by resource users, it must first be ac-
corded some worth by these resource users in terms of their system
of activities.' 6 Resource processes, in order to be classified as "gain-
ful," must have an efficiency greater than a formally stated degree.' '
Firey demonstrates through case studies that the proposition that
the set of ecologically optimal resource processes, the set of eth-
10. Id.
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 21.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 32.
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nologically optimal resource processes, and the set of economically
optimal resource processes universally coincide is false.' 8 He then
demonstrates that there can be no generalized rationale for policy
efforts designed to improve or reduce the efficiency of a people's
resource practices so that those practices would lie completely within
either the set of gainful processes or the set of nongainful processes
because neither of these relationships universally holds for all social
orders.' 9 Having confirmed that a given resource complex may
contain both gainful and nongainful resource processes, Firey sug-
gests that the nongainful elements can be explained as artifacts of
resource users' conformity to practices generally observed in the
resource users' communities and for which practices these users
expect to be held accountable. In such a case, ambivalence is hypoth-
esized for resource users with respect to the range of adoptable pro-
cesses. A resource user's willing conformity implies some latent
inclination on his part to do otherwise. Firey indicates that a re-
source complex predicates of its human agents an accurate percep-
tion of community practices and an inaccurate judgment of gain-
fulness.2 0
[The attitude of willing conformity] manifests a deeply rooted
ambivalence in the human being as a resource user, whereby he finds
himself impelled toward two distinct (though not exclusive) kinds of
practices: the gainful and the likely. Productive efficiency impels
him toward the former; prudence in his relationships with fellow
resource users impels him toward the latter. The one leads him to
experiment and to invent; the other leads him to acquiese and to
preserve.2
Firey finally hypothesizes that a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of a set of newly developed natural resources is concurrent or
antecedent instability in the set of physically possible processes and
the set of socially defined processes.2 2
Firey juxtaposes resource development and resource conservation,
which need not be mutually exclusive but generally are.2 3 Resource
development is any conversion of natural processes into natural
resources qua potential capital whether the resources are actually
used or not. Development occurs when the values and techniques of
a people render elements of their habitat accessible to them at what-
18. Id. at 39-54.
19. Id. at 55-80.
20. Id. at 81-109.
21. Id. at 111-112.
22. Id. at 151-155.
23. Id. at 137.
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ever time they may choose to exploit those elements.2 4 Conserva-
tion is the reduction of a people's standards of consumption so that a
natural resource continues to be available and adoptable for that
population for a longer time than the resource would otherwise
be.2 Development and conservation could occur simultaneously.
Firey's theory of conservation relates to the conceptualization of
resource use and, in having been applied in testing several hypotheses
through case studies, elucidates the difficulty of formulating goals in
a realistically complex policy process. Firey has presented a con-
vincing argument that the system can never be a closed system.
Firey's argument, while simple, is nevertheless grounded in basic
concepts which are easy to assume and assert but very difficult to
definitively evaluate. Concepts are merely tools with which we con-
duct our affairs and the fictions of the concepts should not be used
to make decisions. 2 6 To do so would be to determine a result based
on intuitive abstraction rather than the essence of reality. Problems
with definitions, terms and concepts have a history of plaguing
conservation. For example, Robert H. Bailey has suggested that the
concept of multiple-use has been of limited value to forest land-use
planning because the concept has been frequently equated with the
simple existence of two or more uses on a given area, many foresters
have perceived it to be a principle to be applied to all areas, and the
concept's esoteric nature has tended to isolate the forester from
external sources of expertise needed to effect the optimum use of
forest land.2 7 Conservation is better perceived as an open system
rather than a closed system and distinguishing between the fiction
and the reality of concepts is fundamentally important to practical
decision-making.
THE CONSERVATION ETHIC
Aldo Leopold gave a talk on May 1, 1933, in Las Cruces, New
Mexico, published later that year in the Journal of Forestry under
the title of "The Conservation Ethic."2 8 The ideas contained in that
24. Id. at 136-137.
25. Id. at 137.
26. See Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957). K. Boulding has perceived the
image as a fundamental pan-disciplinary concept suitable as a premise for a new science
dubbed eiconics, THE IMAGE (1956). Compare "thinking it makes it so," the Catch-22 of
psychology, and "thinking it does not make it so," a thesis dubbed the Titanic effect by K.
Watt, THE TITANIC EFFECT (1974).
27. Paper prepared by Robert H. Bailey for the conservation philosophy course at Cor-
nell University (1969).
28. Leopold, The Conservation Ethic, 31 J. FORESTRY 634 (1933).
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article were later given a wider audience through his A Sand County
Almanac,2 9 and are often referred to as his land ethic.
As perceived by Leopold, there are basically two schools of
thought regarding resource management. One school maintains that a
resource is strictly and solely an object from which to produce
goods. The market determines the goals and traditional economics
provides the logic of how to manage the resource. The other school
of thought maintains that resources have non-economic values which
should be maintained. Philosophy asserts the goals and then
economics, as applied logic, is used to aid in managing the resources.
Leopold adamantly sided with the latter school and suggested that
people "quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic
problem." '3 I The conservation ethic is a means of introducing the
non-market, non-economic values into the decision-making process.
If a manager were to make decisions as if he were accountable to
the land for his conduct, his decisions would be different than if he
only had to prepare a financial statement of his conduct towards the
land. In other words, the conservation ethic is considering land as if
it had enforceable standing in the decision-making process." This
extension of ethics to include the land is based on the premise that
the well-being of both man and land is only insured by ecological
complexity. The conservation ethic is not one of general preservation
but encompasses the alteration of resources with the limitation that
soils, waters, plants and animals may continue their existence in
natural states at least in limited areas.
One function of this restraint is the prevention of man's self-d-efeat
by preventing man from irreparably changing his environment to his
own detriment.' 2 Leopold observes, in his writings, that economic
29. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). ROUND RIVER: FROM
THE JOURNALS OF ALDO LEOPOLD (1953), edited by Leopold's son Luna, is composed
of diary excerpts, but it contains a few essays which follow the thrust of the conservation
ethic.
For an analysis of the development of Leopold's philosophy, see S. FLADER, THINK-
ING LIKE A MOUNTAIN: ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN
ECOLOGICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD DEER, WOLVES, AND FORESTS (1974).
30. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 27, at 224.
31. Somewhat along this line, Stone has proposed that natural objects have standing to
sue through a guardian, have damages measured as damages to the natural object itself
(rather than to the human users), and have the damage awards applied to correcting the
harm done to the natural object, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). Cf J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS
(1974).
32. V. Ziswiler agrees: "All examples included in this book are presented with the same
basic reasoning: when man continues to destroy nature, he saws off the very branch on
which he sits since the rational protection of nature is at the same time the protection of
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self-interest is blind to critical elements in the functioning of the
man-land relationship and that to insure a continuing harmony
between man and land an ethic needs to be present in resource
decision-making.3 3 Leopold's key question is whether the land-use
tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic
community as well as whether the land-use is profitable. Leopold's
conservation ethic, or any other conservation philosophy, does not
present final decisions for actions that are universally valid; these
philosophies are only partial modes of reaching decisions.
Ian McHarg reflects the spirit of the conservation ethic in his
Design with Nature3 4 but his formulation of decision-making, which
is primarily applicable to land-use planning, is significantly different.
McHarg suggests that the appropriate criterion for the placement of a
highway or the location of any other activity that has an environ-
mental impact is the "minimum social cost," which is determined by
evaluating areas of land as of no or little value, medium value or high
value for alternative uses. These values are converted to a visual
exhibit by using three tones for each alternative use on an acetate
overlay for a map of the area; the lowest values are represented by
the lightest tone. By stacking all the overlays on the map, the loca-
tion of the area of the minimum social cost is revealed by the lightest
zones.
Unfortunately, questions inherent in this method are not ade-
quately answered by McHarg. First, how are the uses defined and
which uses are included in and which others are excluded from the
analysis? Second, can one significantly rank areas and, if one does,
how arbitrary are the divisions between the levels of values? Third,
are the various values for different aspects of land and land-use
comparable or are the trade-offs made in an arbitrary manner? For
example, is the high value zone for wildlife comparable to the high
value zone for housing vis-a-vis the placement of a highway?
McHarg presents his arguments and documents them with
examples of his work in an effort to sell the concept, but a more
balanced theoretical analysis, complemented by highway placement
study, is Douglas Lacate's The Role of Resource Inventories and
mankind," EXTINCT AND VANISHING ANIMALS: A BIOLOGY OF EXTINCTION AND
SURVIVAL viii (1965).
33. Although of limited application to conservation, the common law concept of waste is
a measure designed to maintain the productive capacity of real estate. Orthodox legal
analysis suggests that this principle of law is not grounded on any esoteric concept of
maintaining an ecosystem but is simply based on the protection of owners of subsequent
interests and landlords; in doing so, socially valuable resources tend to be preserved.
34. 1. McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969).
July 1977]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Landscape Ecology in the Highway Route Selection Process."
Lacate suggests that the use of high and low ratings is not as im-
portant as identification (and implicitly definition) of landscape fea-
tures along with knowing the location, size and shape of occupied
areas in the context of how adjacent areas might also be influenced.
Some value priorities are found to be obvious, but others are not
incorporable into the stack of map overlays because there is a lack of
usable information. Lacate emphasizes that it is important for the
interpreter of land forms to know at what level of decision-making
the various bits of information are to be incorporated. He also des-
cribes the value of aerial photographs as sources of information;
implied in the use of these photographs is the point made by him in
earlier articles that land should not be considered as a bundle of
discrete charateristics but rather as an integrated form upon which a
person imposes, by interpretation, characteristics and values.3 6
Questions of rationality, choosing means appropriate to the goals,
and optimality, picking the means and goals for the greatest benefit,
are raised by any decision-making methodology. McHarg's minimum
social cost method is not assuredly optimal, but the methodology is
rational because it recognizes that there are many values affected by
major land use changes. His methodology forces the conscientious
planner to deal with these values; this confrontation between planner
and values should result in better land-use planning.' I
In contrast to McHarg's attempt to incorporate many values into
the planning process while recognizing the constraints of nature,
Leopold's conservation ethic presents an emphasis on the biotic
community as an entity of independent value. The land is not simply
a constraint on, as well as a source of, marketable production; the
biotic community has inherent value. George F. Kennan has taken
essentially the same position by advocating that the interests of
"mankind generally, together-and this is important-with man's
animal and vegetable companions" must be the basis of environ-
mental conservation. 3 8 Such a noble position, while tenable, is the
extreme version of the argument for conserving the biotic com-
munity.3 9 The usual thrust of the argument is that the well-being of
35. D. LACATE, THE ROLE OF RESOURCE INVENTORIES AND LANDSCAPE
ECOLOGY IN THE HIGHWAY ROUTE SELECTION PROCESS (1970).
36. Lacate, A Review of Landtype Classification and Mapping, 37 LAND ECON. 271
(1961); Lacate, Wildland Inventory and Mapping, 42 FORESTRY CHRONICLE 184
(1966).
37. See also CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THREE APPROACHES TO ENVIRON-
MENTAL RESOURCE ANALYSIS (1967).
38. Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: a proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFF. 408 (1970).
39. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-47 (effective
[Vol. 17
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man is dependent on the well-being of the biotic community.4" In
any case, the concept that biota have value of their own, indepen-
dent of man's valuation of them as resources, can be adopted as an
"as if" theory made operational by incorporating into the decision-
making process a presumption that the natural environment should
be preserved even absent a showing of tangible benefits to man. Such
a working presumption would be an adoption of the conservation
ethic.
USE OVER TIME
S. Ciriacy-Wantrup presents a simple, elegant theory of conser-
vation in his Resource Conservation. economics and policies.
4 1
Ciriacy-Wantrup defines conservation as a change in the time dis-
tribution of use rates of individual resources in which the aggregate
weighted change in use rates is greater than zero. Depletion is defined
as such a change that is less than zero. 4 2 The theory can be ex-
pressed mathematically. 4  He applies his theory, denoted in this
article as Use Over Time, to a wide range of examples and perhaps
makes his theory the most thoroughly explained of any of conser-
vation.
Ciriacy-Wantrup's definition of conservation is only descriptive.
Conservation is not necessarily good; depletion is not necessarily bad.
The evaluation of the utility of conservation is dependent on what
the goals of the decision-maker are and whether depletion or con-
servation rationally relate to these goals. The definitions of conser-
vation and depletion are predictive and positive 4 4 in that they are
Jan. 1, 1970), appears to be premised on both views. Section 4322 states that the purposes
of the act are "To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man...."
40. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). Hardin concludes,
much like Leopold, that a fundamental extension in morality is essential since no technical
solution exists to the general problem.
41. S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND
POLICIES (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCE CONSERVATION]. RE-
SOURCE CONSERVATION is not a survey of economic theory re natural resources; for
such a survey, see 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES (1974). A worthwhile exercise would be a thoughtful reading of A. SCOTT,
NATURAL RESOURCES: THE ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION (1973).
42. Resource Conservation, id. at 53.
43. Id. at 379-381.
44. See M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953); but see
Galbraith, Economics and the Quality of Life, 145 SCI. 117 (1964). Herfindahl & Kneese,
supra note 41 at 41, observe that the theory of welfare economics is both positive and
normative. The theory is normative because it deals with policy issues in which value
judgments are inherent.
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key to the analysis of how resource users respond to changing con-
ditions of taxation, tenancy, rates of interest, etc. Ciriacy-Wantrup
goes further than these definitions and suggests that decisions should
not be made which would make the halting and reversal of depletion
uneconomical.4 I This criterion of the critical zone of irreversible
depletion is a normative judgment but nevertheless crucial to his
theory.
The effects of conservation or depletion must be evaluated in
terms of human goals defined for each resource user rather than for
universally standard goals for small unit decision-making.4 6 If the
goal is farming, fertility depleting crops may be rational in the short-
run but management practices that induce gully erosion would
probably be irrational. Fertility can normally be economically
replenished but gullies may effectively eliminate farming as a use of
that land. When a decision is to be reached, the analysis of its effects
should be carried not only to the immediate goal but also to the
ultimate effect on the resource.4' 7
The general practice in financial accounting is to consider land
used for site purposes as nondepreciable and land used for the ex-
ploitation of nonrenewable resources as depletable. Timber lands
have been traditionally considered as depletable. With the establish-
ment of tree farms, the financial accounting would presumably be
adopted to the recurring resource. Miguel A. de Capriles observes
that:
In principle, accounting authorities agree that agricultural land
should be depreciated, although sometimes they speak of "expira-
tion" of the "value" of land as a result of "erosion and cropping."
However, modern methods of cultivation tend to prolong the fer-
tility of farm land. This factor, together with the secular trend
toward higher land prices, may lead to a situation (similar to that of
land used for site purposes) where no predictable net cost can be
allocated over the economic life of farm land.48
Financial accounting is obviously important for the management
of resources. Serious systematic errors apparently do not arise due to
the inherent methodology, but rather due to the conception of the
resource held by the manager 4 9 or the taxing authorities. Currently,
the accounting of business operations does not include negative or
45. RESOURCE CONSERVATION, supra note 41 at 253.
46. Societal goals are distinguished. See also Price, Values and Concepts in Conservation,
45 ANNALS ASS'N. AM. GEOG'RS 64 (1955).
47. See Gaffney, Soil Depletion and Land Rent, 4 NAT. RES. J. 537 (1965).
48. de Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting (Part!), 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1080 (1962).
49. See, United States v. Reserve Mining Co. 380 F. Supp. 11 (D.C. Minn. 1974).
[Vol. 17
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positive externalities although legislation might expand financial
accounting to include these social costs and benefits.
Although Use Over Time differs from the conservation ethic, the
results of both philosophies tend to the same conclusions.' 0 The
conservation ethic uses the criterion of the tendency to preserve the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. Use Over
Time has the criterion of avoiding the critical zone of irreversible
depletion. These criteria are complementary in that the conservation
ethic and Use Over Time select the same set of decisions, with selec-
tion within the set being made by other criteria such as efficiency.
Efficiency is a pervasive concept and can not be ignored by any
rational decision-maker. In brief, the efficiency criterion tests
whether or not the benefits exceed the costs (including opportunity
costs) and provides a means of selecting the best decisions out of a
pool of acceptable decisions.' '
UTILITARIAN CONSERVATION
In 1789, Jeremy Bentham published the first edition of his An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which is an
outline of utilitarian philosophy. The underlying principle of utili-
tarian philosophy, as formulated by Bentham, is that actions should
be directed towards creating the greatest happiness for the greatest
number.5 2 Greatest happiness for the greatest number is measured
by summing the interests of persons vis-a-vis actions and comparing
the net sums. Utilitarianism assumes quantification and inter-
changeability (or comparability) of individual welfare functions.
Bentham's book is directed towards jurisprudence, but utili-
tarianism is a consummate philosophy.5 s The basic utilitarian prin-
ciple was the predecessor of one formulation of conservation as
propounded by Gifford Pinchot, Theodore Roosevelt and W. J.
McGee. They chose utilitarianism as one means to explain and, I
suspect, to analyze their actions.
The Pinchot-Roosevelt-McGee formulation includes an additional
term, "for the longest time," and provides a special construction to
the original terms of the utilitarian principle. The basic tenet of
50. But see Hutchison, Bringing Resource Conservation into the Main Stream of Amer-
ican Thought, 9 NAT. RES. J. 532 (1969).
51. Project size and budget constraint present practical and theoretical difficulties in
ranking projects.
52. An antecedent is Cesare Bonesane, marchese di Beccaria, Tratto dei delitti e delle
pene (1764) [An Essay on Crimes and Punishment (translation 1778)].
53. "The dominant, often inchoate and unconscious, social philosophy of western in-
tellectuals and professionals is utilitarianism." Fried, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1691 (1972).
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utilitarian conservation is that decisions should be made with the
goal of producing the "greatest good to the greatest number for the
longest time."
In 19 10, Pinchot published a collection of essays under the title of
The Fight for Conservation. 4 Many of the essays were previously
published and were aimed at the general public. As a result, the book
is not a learned treatise on conservation philosophy, but it never-
theless reveals the fundamental premises Pinchot used to justify his
conception of utilitarian conservation. The "greatest good" was
conceived as the balancing of individual interests, but the "greatest
number" was a code word signifying an anti-trust political criterion.
"Longest time" was a test of whether an action would tend to pre-
serve or waste resources.
Orris C. Herfindahl has argued that Pinchot's formulation of
conservation is internally inconsistent.5 I According to Herfindahl,
Pinchot's goal is the simultaneous maximization of three variables,
the greatest good, the greatest number, and the longest time. Such a
maximization would be admittedly nonsensical if the variables were
independent of each other, but Pinchot had a clear system of pri-
orities within and among the three variables. Pinchot's definition of
conservation is a short-hand reference to a set of benchmarks for
decision-making, rather than an economics or a mathematical ex-
pression of quantity.
The anti-trust political criterion rejects the proposition that some
resources may be better managed for everyone by large private units
because of economies of scale.' 6 Micro-economic theory even
54. G. PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (1967). See also G. PINCHOT,
BREAKING NEW GROUND 504-10 (1972); Pinchot, How Conservation Began, 11
AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 255 (1937).
55. Herfindahl, What is Conservation?, in THREE STUDIES IN MINERAL ECONOMICS
1 (1961). Hardin made a similar error regarding Bentham's formulation, supra note 40.
Ciriacy-Wantrup seems to have misinterpreted Pinchot's formulation, RESOURCE CON-
SERVATION, supra note 41 at 49. See also Gordon, Economics and the Conservation
Question, I J. LAW & ECON. 113 (1958). Contra, Kury, Gifford Pinchot's Philosophy, 73
J. FORESTRY 154 (1975).
56. Meyers' criticism of Sax's assumption that the 160-acre limitation for a single farmer
for federal irrigation benefits as a good thing implicitly rejects the criterion. Meyers, Book
Review, 77 YALE L. J. 1036 (1969). The Supreme Court, in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958), observes that the 1.60-acre limitation "is a reasonable
classification to limit the amount of project water available to each individual in order that
benefits may be distributed in accordance with the greatest good to the greatest number of
individuals. The limitation insures that this enormous expenditure will not go in dispropor-
tionate shares to a few individuals with large land holdings. Moreover, it prevents the use of
the federal reclamation service for speculative purposes." The acreage limitation has
frequently been avoided. See R. BERKMAN & W. VISCUSI, DAMMING THE WEST
139-150 (1973). The National Water Commission, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
142-149 (1973), has recommended that the 160-acre limitation be abolished but that the
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suggests that "a monopolist would tend to use resources at a lower
rate now and thus produce for a longer time in the future than the
competitor in a similar market."' ' J. K. Galbraith points out, how-
ever, that:
Were there competition, there would be many firms, each much
smaller and with a different technology and different cost functions.
One does not know, accordingly, whether the competitive equilib-
rium would be at a greater or smaller level of output, investment or
employment.5 8
Pinchot would not have been concerned with the apparent con-
tradiction of being against monopolies and trusts (with their alleged
better management and deferred time preference), yet being for good
management and the preservation of resources for the future. If there
is any contradiction at all, Pinchot had a ready solution: government
regulation or public ownership and management, either of which
could "rationalize" resource practices and could also incorporate a
future-oriented time preference.
It is quite clear from Pinchot's writings that there is no necessary
contradiction between the preservation of resources and the con-
sumption in the present. He stated that present consumption has
preference over future consumption. If, however, there were two
courses of actions which could be taken, Pinchot would have pre-
ferred the one that, with all other things being equal, would tend to
preserve the resource for the future. Pinchot suggested that hydro-
power be used in preference to coal in generating electricity since
hydro-power is naturally renewed but coal is effectively a fixed stock
that with use can only be diminished.' I He did not say that hydro-
power should invariably be preferred to coal, but merely that the
development of energy resources should not be indifferent to long
term problems.
Pinchot's conservation philosophy does not include an ethical
restraint on present consumption6 0 and so, in his view, society
should not sacrifice for future generations. Society should shift its
resource use patterns from control by trusts; from unnecessary
direct beneficiaries pay the full costs of the irrigation projects. See also Taylor, Water, Land,
and Environment, Imperial Valley: Law Caught in the Winds of Politics, 13 NAT. RES. J. 1
(1973).
57. Scott, supra note 41 at 98; see also 43-46, 97-106.
58. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 16 (1973).
59. For an introduction to stock resources and for an explanation why the term may be
misleading, see McDIVITT, MINERALS AND MEN (1965).
60. Which is in accord with the conventional wisdom of economics. See H. BARNETT &
C. MORSE, SCARCITY AND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AVAILABILITY (1963).
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consumption, such as uncontrolled forest fires; and from irreversible
consumption to reversible use where the needs of the present society
are indifferent. 6 I
Pinchot's conservation philosophy emphasizes societal criteria in
decision-making with a limitation against physical-economic waste.
Compared with Leopold's conservation ethic, utilitarian conservation
has a closer time horizon. Leopold, who was concerned with living
resources, was philosophizing about maintaining the biological
machinery of the land indefinitely. Pinchot was in addition con-
cerned with so-called stock resources and his writings reflect his
purported belief that industrial society, as he knew it, might have a
life limited by mineral resources. Certainly Pinchot was aware of the
economic principle of interchangeability of inputs and he did not
necessarily write off technological advancement. His concern with
stock resources can be interpreted as that a natural resources policy
should not be indifferent to final consumption as opposed to re-
cycleable use or, more generally, irreversible processes versus rever-
sible processes.
SUMMARY
As Ronald Beazley notes: "Conservation ... is the establishment
and observation of economically, socially, and politically acceptable
norms, standards, patterns, or models of behavior in the use of
natural resources by a given society."6 2 Conservation is concerned
with the level, manner, and location of investment in natural re-
sources 63and a dynamic element is present. 6 I Walter Firey has
modeled these elements sufficiently so that an observer has an initial
framework within which to analyze complex resource issues. But
analysis is not enough for rational decisions; some normative bench-
marks are needed as a base for a relative, if Sisyphean, 6 s rationality.
Aldo Leopold's and S. Ciriacy-Wantrup's views on the need to have a
presumption for preservation of natural conditions provide an in-
tellectual underpinning for much of the recent environmental con-
61. Present needs are unlikely to be indifferent and the prevention of physical-economic
waste can entail sacrifice by the present society. Bentham, in contrast, was willing to
consider future generations in his calculus and apparently even animals. Utilitarianism is, as
a practical matter, anthropocentric and present oriented.
62. Beazley, Conservation Decision-making: a rationalization, 7 NAT. RES. .. 345
(1967).
63. Id. at 347.
64. Id. at 347-348. R. BALCH, THE ECOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT (1965), recognizes the
significance of the ever changing milieu of natural resources decision-making and that an
expression of this condition has often been controversy.
65. See Newberry, The Ecological State of Siege, 32 ANTIOCH REV. 449 (1973).
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cerns. Gifford Pinchot was likewise concerned with the preservation
of resources and he perceived resource policies as also political
policies. He advocated an anti-trust policy as a key element in his
own conservation philosophy. Ideas such as these are not enough in
and of themselves to guide us unerringly through decision processes,
but they do constitute, if viewed as through a fish's eye, aids in
developing rational resource policies.
